BACKGROUND
In 2002 It is against this background that Moseneke v The Master 2 will be analysed.
3
In this paper a general introduction of the facts of the case will be given.
Thereafter the principles applied by die court in evaluating racial discrimination laws and the interests of justice will be highlighted. The case deals with certain provisions of the Black Administration Act, 4 which applies to
Africans living under a system of customary law, and emphasis will be on the development of practical guidelines for South African courts confronted with issues of a political, socio-economic and cultural nature. Finally, the relevant changes proposed by the minister as a result of the decision reached in the Moseneke case will briefly be referred to.
FACTS OF THE CASE 5
The facts of the case may be summarised as follows: 6 Mr Moseneke (hereinafter the deceased) died intestate in October 1999. He was survived by his wife and four sons (hereinafter the appellants). The deceased and the appellants led, what they called, an urban lifestyle. The estate of the deceased had to be administered by a magistrate, 7 whilst all other estates must be administered by the master. 8 The appellants were dissatisfied with the situation and expressed their concern to the master saying that the differential treatment amounted to unfair discrimination on the ground of race.
Following on their letter to the master, the appellant referred the matter to the high court for an order declaring that regulation 3(1) 9 is unconstitutional and that the master be instructed to administer the estate of the deceased. 10 The high court made a final order, 11 which declared regulation 3(1) 5 The provisions of the 1996 Constitution were applied to the case and, therefore, all references to the Constitution refer to the 1996 Constitution unless otherwise indicated. 6
Paras [2-4]. 7
Regulation 3(1) of GN R2000 (Government Gazette 10601 of 6 February 1987). GN R2000 was promulgated under section 23(10) of the Black Administration Act. In terms of regulation 3(1) a magistrate must administer the estate of a deceased Black. 8
In terms of section 4 of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 the master has the power to administer all other estates. These estates will include the estates of whites, coloureds, Indian people and testate Black estates. 9
Regulation 3(1) reads: "All the property in any estate falling within the purview of paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of regulation 2 of these regulations [namely of a Black person leaving no valid will] shall be administered under the supervision of a magistrate in whose area of jurisdiction the deceased ordinarily resided and such magistrate shall give such directions in regard to the distribution thereof as shall seem to him fit…." 10 The draft order read as follows: "1. The minister argued that the constitutional court should not confirm the order given by the high court. If, however, the court were to confirm the relevant order, he argued that the declaration of invalidity should be suspended for a period of three years to enable the Parliament to revise the relevant legislation. In the alternative, the minister noted an appeal against the judgement of the high court. See Paras [11] [12] . 17 Par [14] . Sachs J then proceeded to consider the merits of the appellant's application as well as the merits of the appeal noted by the minister. In the following paragraphs the main issues emanating from the decision of Sachs J will be discussed in more detail. 18 In addition the minister referred to current developments in the field of customary law, namely the investigation of the SALC (project 90) and 
3.

MAIN ISSUES OF THE CASE
Invalidating racial discrimination laws
According to Sachs J the laws differentiating between the administration of deceased estates of Blacks and other people is clearly rooted in "racist attitudes and practices of the past". He emphasises that all racial discrimination laws must change, but cautions against change "with a simple stroke of a pen."
20
The dangers associated with the mere striking down of racial discrimination laws are clearly illustrated by the judgement of the court a quo. The high court made an order declaring regulation 3(1) unconstitutional and invalid. The effect of the order was that magistrates had no competence to deal with intestate Black estates. At the same time, the master had no competence to deal with the same estates. The result was that intestate Black estates could not be administered at all. The president of the constitutional court detected this lacuna and required the parties to argue with regard to the validity of section 23(7)(a).
21
Although Sachs J's decision in the constitutional court rectified the lacuna caused by the striking down of regulation 3(1), without striking down section 23(7)(a), the order of the high court clearly illustrates that courts should not invalidate racial discrimination legislation without considering the implications of such an act.
Practical guideline: Racial discrimination laws should not be invalidated
without considering all the implications of such an act.
The interests of justice
The principle of "interests of justice" figures very prominently I throughout the judgement of Sachs J. One of the issues was the absence of the minister in the high court proceedings. The question, which was dealt with by Sachs J, was whether the minister should be allowed to join the proceedings in the constitutional court if he was not a party in the high court. Sachs J pointed out that the minister should have been a party to the proceedings in the high court. 22 The courts 23 have the power to regulate their own process taking into account the "interests of justice." 24 Sachs J held that it would be in the interests of justice to permit the minister to join the proceedings in the constitutional court, because "there is a need to deal with this matter expeditiously."
25
The principle of interests of justice was also applied to solve the issue whether direct access should be granted to the appellants with regard to the constitutionality of section 23(7)(a). 26 Rule 17(2)(a) of the constitutional court lay down that the application for direct access in terms of section 167(6)(a) of the Constitution must set out:
… the ground on which it is contended that it is in the interests of justice that an order for direct access be granted …
27
Sachs held that it would be in the interests of justice to grant the appellants direct access by taking the following factors into consideration:
In terms of rule 6(2) of the constitutional court (in Government Notice R757 in Regulation Gazette 6199 of 29 May 1998) the relevant authority responsible certain laws must be informed if the constitutionality of such laws are being disputed in a court. It was argued on behalf of the minister that the minister should have been a party to the proceedings in the high court because the proceedings in the high court concerned the validity of a regulation administered by his department. See par [13] . 23 Constitutional court, supreme court of appeal and high courts. 24 Section 173 of the Constitution. 25 Par [13] . 26 At this point it is important to remember that the order of the high court concerned only regulation 3(1) and, therefore, the appellants applied, in the alternative (in terms of rule 17 of the constitutional court), for direct access to the constitutional court for the invalidation of section 23(7). 27 Own ephasis. 28 Par [19] . It is clear that the court intermingled the principles "interests of justice" and "public interest" by saying: "…the public interest requires that the family [appellants] nevertheless be granted direct access to challenge the constitutionality of the section and the regulation". These principles are not the same and vary in various respects. It is clear that Sachs J meant that the interests of justice and not the public interest requires 
The constitutionality of the Black Administration Act
The Black Administration Act commenced on 1 September 1927 29 with a view to the establishment of a national system for, amongst others, the recognition and application of customary law insofar as it was not repugnant to the western perception of public policy and natural justice.
30
The aim of the Act is to "provide for the better management of Black Affairs."
31
The term "Black" includes "any person who is a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa." 32 Sachs J explains:
33
The Act systematised and enforced a colonial form of relationship and a subordinate black majority who were to have rights of citizenship and a subordinate black majority who were to be administered. The classification of the category of persons that are subject to the provisions of the Act is solely based on a person's race. Within this context the Act equates race with culture. A dominant white male orientated government also based the Act on political considerations, such as the control of Black people by a dominant white minorty. Sachs J strongly condemned the Act and said: 34 It is an affront to all of us that people are still treated as 'blacks' rather than as ordinary persons seeking to wind up a deceased estate, and it is in conflict with the establishment of a non-racial society where rights and duties are no longer determined by origin or skin colour. It is painful that the Act still survives at all. The concepts on which it was based, the memories it evokes, the language it continues to employ, and the division it still enforces, are antithetical to the society envisaged by the Constitution. It is an affront to all of us that people are still treated as "blacks" rather than as ordinary persons seeking to wind up a deceased estate, and it is in conflict with the establishment of a non-racial society where rights and duties are no longer determined by origin or skin colour.
37
In this case, however, the court had to decide whether a section 23 (7) 
Limitation of rights
The Constitution recognises the fact that fundamental rights are not absolute.
Under section 36 fundamental rights may be limited in terms of "law of general application" to the extent that the limitation is "reasonable and justifiable" In the Moseneke case the minister and the master suggested that the administration of intestate Black estates by magistrates were often convenient and inexpensive. The limitation on the administration of intestate Black estates was therefore reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36 of the
Constitution.
51
Sachs J rejected their argument and held that the justification for the differentiation is "rooted in racial discrimination which severely assails the dignity of those concerned and undermines attempts to establish a fair and equitable system of public administration." 52 Sachs J pointed out that convenience and cost should not be linked to race and that it should be at the disposal of all people of limited means that live in urban areas located far from the offices of the master. 53 Sachs J held that section 23 (7) To keep a manifestly racist law on the statute books is to maintain discrimination; to abolish it with immediate effect without making practical alternative arrangements is to provoke confusion and risk injustice.
In order to reach a just and equitable order he held as follows: In order to reach the objective in (b), it was held that section 23(7)(a) was invalid with immediate effect, 58 but the declaration of invalidity in respect of regulation 3(1) was suspended for a period of two years. In order to empower the master to administer deceased African estates, Sachs J held that the word "shall' in regulation 3(1) must be replaced with the word "may" for a period of two years.
59
Quite unique to the judgement is the following order of Sachs J:
Any interested person may approach this Court for 
Gender equality
As already stated, the Women's Legal Centre Trust argued that both section 23(7)(a) and regulation 3(1) are unconstitutional, because they discriminate directly and indirectly against African women on the grounds of race, gender and culture. 62 Although they supported the court's invalidation of both section 23(7)(a) and regulation 3(1) they opposed the court's suspension of the invalidation order with regard to regulation 3(1) and argued that the court should make an order which would be operative as soon as possible. They contended that widows and children are being adversely affected by the way magistrates administer intestate Black estates and that regulation 3 was the "gateway into a system of administration which placed women and children of society is to be respected, proper consideration has to be given to the way the measures concerned impact in practice both on the dignity of widows and their ability to enjoy a rightful share of the family's worldly goods. 
THE WAY FORWARD
The Moseneke case deals with estates that devolve according to common law only and not with estates that devolve according to customary law. 66 In case of the latter, section 23(7)(b) of the Black Administration Act prohibits the master from dealing with certain kinds of property accruing in terms of "Black law and custom" as described in section 23 (1) and (2) The order of Sachs J was given on 6 December 2000. This means that regulation 3(1) will be invalid from 6 December 2002. The result will be that magistrates will no longer be able to administer intestate Black estates from that date. Up to date no substituting legislation have been promulgated.
The SALC has not finalised its investigation into the customary law of succession, and it is uncertain whether its recommendations in this regard will be available in time to meet the deadline of the constitutional court. 
